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THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS: NEW
DIMENSIONS IN SUPREME COURT-
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1968
JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, LARRY L. BERG AND ALBERT
MELONE*
Modern academic interpretations of the status of the Supreme Court
in the American political system have commonly accepted the notion
that the Supreme Court is protected from political attack by an aura of
reverence. The Court Packing Fight of 1937 was the seminal controversy
which allegedly provided the basis for such an assumption.1 Thus, this
notion was basic to Cortez A. M. Ewing's view, in 1938, that ". . . the
public has sacerdotalized the court."'2 Similarly, in 1939, Felix
Frankfurter developed another variation, namely that:
...multitudes of Americans seriously believe that the nine Justices
embody pure reason, that they are set apart from the concerns of the
community, regardless of time, place, and circumstances, to become the
interpreter of Sacred words with meaning fixed forever and ascertainable
by a process of ineluctable reasoning.3
By the 1960's, the "reverence" for the Court idea became a basic
explanatory concept in assessments of Congress' relationship to the
Supreme Court. In 1961, Walter Murphy and Herman Pritchett
contended that,
. ..Courts are protected by their magic; only rarely can a hand be laid
on a judge without a public outcry of sacrilege. 4
* John R. Schmidhauser is Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa; Larry L. Berg is
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California; and Albert Melone is
Assistant Professor of Political Science, North Dakota State University. Research for the roll call
analysis was supported by the National Science Foundation (GS-2862).
1. For a reappraisal of the Court Packing controversy which challenges this assumption see J.
SCHMIDHAUSER & L. BERG, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: TiE POST WAR ERA, 1945-1968 (sche-
duled for publication in 1971 by the Free Press of Macmillan Company) [hereinafter cited as
CONGRESS AND THE COURT], especially Chapter VII.
2. C. EWING, THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREM COURT, 1789-1937, at 63 (1938).
3. F. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS 108 (1939).
4. W. MURPHY & H. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 554-55 (1961).
Washington University Open Scholarship
210 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
This was reemphasized by Pritchett's comment apropos the
Congressional attacks of 1957-1961 that,
Basically, the Court was protected by the respect which is so widely felt
for the judicial institution in the United States.5
In a similar vein, Glendon Schubert stressed legal professionalism as a
bulwark of the Court in Congressional reversal of statutory
interpretation issues:
Many congressmen are lawyers; and the argument that proponents of an
amendatory bill are showing disrespect for the highest court in the land is
an effective one.'
In 1970, Thomas Halper wrote an article devoted primarily to an
assessment of the nature of the policy or institutional responses available
to the justices in the face of hostile reactions to Supreme Court decisions.
Halper noted "signs of recent erosion" of the bases of Supreme Court
support. He also conceded that Congressmen may be tempted "to
appeal to (and thereby heighten) their constituents' irrationality."
Nevertheless, Halper implicitly maintained a commitment to the
concept of reverence for the Court-the erosion of support was, in his
words, "recent". Like Schubert, Halper assumed that Congressmen
who are members of the legal profession behave differently when dealing
with the judiciary. He explicitly argued that:
Since 58.9% of the members of Congress have law degrees, and all are
involved professionally in the workings of the government, we may
assume that they are far better informed and more lawyer-like in their
thinking than the general public. .... I
Finally, Stephen Wasby's comprehensive appraisal of the variety of
judicial impact studies concluded with a series of generalizations and
hypotheses which in most respects perpetuated the theme of reverence for
the Court. Wasby did, however, draw upon the preliminary findings of
Murphy and Tanenhaus to qualify some of the basic assumptions of the
"reverence for the Court" advocates with respect to public opinion.
Wasby accepted the essentials of Schubert's generalization concerning
5. H. PrcHETr, CONGREss VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1961, at 119 (1961).
6. G. SCHUBERT, CONSTrruTIONAL POLriCS 257-58 (1960).
7. Halper, Supreme Court Responses to Congressional Threats: Strategy and Tactics, 19 DRAKE
L. REv. 292, 320-23 (1970).
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lawyers. In Wasby's hypothesis: "Lawyers are more likely to comply
with Supreme Court decisions than are non-lawyers." 8
To what extent is Congressional antagonism toward the Court
"'recent"? Has there been a truly significant change in Congressional
attitudes in the last three or four decades? Were the bitter ideological
attacks leveled against Fortas because of Congressional antagonism to
the thrust of the Warren Court decisions uncharacteristic of
Congressional-Court relations in the 20th Century? Has the shift from a
pro-business, anti-regulatory position by the Roosevelt, Stone, Vinson
and Warren Courts ultimately eroded significant and influential bases
for support in American Society? Subsequent analysis of 147 House and
Senate roll calls in the post-World War I I era was undertaken to provide
preliminary answers to these questions. The roll call and membership
data provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political
Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, was utilized.
This research report is an investigation of Congressional roll call
behavior and interest group activity in response to Supreme Court
decisions involving civil rights and liberties, and economic, labor and
welfare issues. The report is designed to explore the nature and relative
stability of those variables which may influence Congressmen when they
vote on judiciary-oriented roll calls in the above mentioned issue
categories. The conceptual frame of reference of Walter Burnham's
emphasis upon time series analysis,' and of contemporary investigations
of the impact of judicial decisions, 1' is basic to this study. A broader
perspective for understanding the nature of Congressional-Court
relations may be gained by utilization of an investigatory emphasis
which embodies a convergence of interest group analysis and roll call
behavioral studies in chronological sequence. This report is a followup of
the original research reported in John R. Schmidhauser and Larry L.
Berg, Congress and the Supreme Court: The Post War Era, 1945-1968.
A number of students of the Supreme Court have argued that a
discernable distinction can be made between Congressional attitudes
toward the Court regarding ordinary legislative reversals of statutory
interpretations and extraordinary actions which, in substance, would
8. S. WAsBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES 261,
266 (1970).
9. W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS X-Xi
(1970).
10. See, e.g., T. BECKER, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES
(1969); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES
(1970).
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weaken the Court as an institution. Summarizing conventional historical
descriptions of legislative anti-decision and anti-Court attacks, Stuart
Nagel argued that "relatively milder" Court-Curbing bills had a
"substantially higher rate of success." 11 More specifically, Harry
Stumpf concluded that:
The prestige or sacrosanctity argument in Congress is used and used with
some effectiveness in protecting the judiciary against anti-Court legislative
reaction. . . .However, in anti-decision action, especially in simple
reversals, the argument that reversal advocates are showing disrespect for
the Court is not only little used, but if used at all, is almost totally
ineffective.' 2
Presumably, if Stumpf's hypothesis is correct, members of Congress
may be expected to demonstrate higher levels of support for the Supreme
Court when voting on roll calls involving direct institutional attacks on
the Court than when the roll calls involve statutory reversals.
Another related hypothesis focuses attention directly upon the
interest group behavior and tactics of business-oriented organizations.
Thus, Arthur S. Miller has argued, building upon a seminal paper by
Alan Westin, that Congress has developed a system of "appellate
review" of administrative and judicial decisions which were viewed by
business-oriented interest groups as detrimental.13
If, as Alan Westin suggested, direct institutional clashes between the
corporate business community and the Supreme Court were averted
because business interests developed resort to Congress to secure
reversals of anti-business judicial statutory interpretations, then the
incidence of direct institutional attacks upon the Supreme Court would
bear an inverse correlation to the number of Congressional reversals of
statutory interpretations by the Court. Since the members of the
Conservative Coalition in Congress generally are oriented toward the
interest groups representing the business community (i.e., U.S. Chamber
of Commer ,e, the National Association of Manufacturers and other
groups including the American Bar Association operating through
11. S. NAGEL, THm LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 277 (1969).
12. Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and
Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 376, 394 (1955).
13. A. MILLER, THm SUPRME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 108 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as MILLER]; see also A. Westin, Corporate Appeals to Congress from Supreme Court Rulings,
(unpublished paper presented to the 1962 Convention of the American Political Science
Ass'n).
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interest group "summit" conferences such as Greenbrier)," do members
of this Coalition attack the Court institutionally more frequently when
statutory reversals decrease or vice versa? Furthermore, is there any
significant difference in Congressional roll call behavior when civil fights
and civil liberties issues are at stake in contrast to economic issues such
as statutory reversal controversies involving business, labor, or welfare?
Arthur Miller argues that there is a difference, contending that "Much
less success has resulted in efforts by others to legislatively overrule the
Supreme Court in civil-liberty and civil-fights decisions ... ."15 One
hundred and forty-seven House and Senate roll calls (all are categorized
and described chronologically in the Appendix infra) were voted upon in
the period 1945-1968 which comprised virtually every division relating to
Congressional-Supreme Court relations in the post-World War II era.
Utilizing the totality of roll calls, what do these divisions indicate?
I. DIRECT INSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS CONTRASTED TO REVERSAL OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS BY CONGRESS
An examination of the voting behavior of Congressmen and Senators
was made of the ten roll calls in the House of Representatives and the
twenty-one roll calls in the Senate which were distinctly attacks on the
Court as an institution during the period 1947-1968, the 80th through
90th Congresses. The 79th Congress was analyzed separately. These
were compared with the roll calls which were not direct institutional
attacks, but mere reversals by Congress of statutory interpretations
made by the Supreme Court. To what extent did successful invocation of
the Congressional power to reverse statutory reversals avert direct
institutional attacks upon the Supreme Court?
In Table 1, the incidence of the two types is summarized by Congress.
The results generally indicate that direct institutional attacks did not
occur as often in Congresses which frequently reversed statutory
interpretations. But this summary does not provide direct evidence to
either support or contradict Westin's hypothesis. Roll calls, by the very
fact that they have been invoked in the legislative process, generally
represent divisions which were not susceptible of resolution by
negotiation or bargaining. In both categories of issues, specific
legislative disagreements sometimes proliferated a large number of roll
14. D. HALL, COOPERATIVE LOBBYING-THE POWER OF PREssuRE 32-34, 188-212 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as HALL].
15. MILLER 108.
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call divisions. In the 79th Congress, for example, five of the six statutory
interpretation reversal roll calls involved variations on a single
parliamentary theme, the Congressional attempt at substituting its
interpretation for that of the Supreme Court regarding Tidelands Oil.
Thus, the actual number of contested bills (indicated in parentheses) is
considerably smaller in most Congresses than the roll call divisions
which were called for by the protagonists of competing positions. The
proliferation of roll call divisions is, at best, a crude indicator of inten-
sity of conflict and, perhaps, parliamentary skill. Ultimately, it shall
be necessary to utilize the total universe of legislative actions in each
successive Congress in order to accurately test the validity of Westin's
hypothesis. The diminishing number of economic roll call divisions
generally apparent in the chronological order of Congresses from 1945
to 1968 may well reflect the growing. success of the corporate business
community in overturning statutory interpretations without provoking
the numerous roll call divisions characteristic of the late 1940's and the
1950's. In 1966, for example, the 89th Congress, importuned by various
interest groups including the American Bar Association, passed H.R.
11256, a bill relating to the priority of federal tax liens and levies.
Although this bill overruled two Supreme Court decisions," it was
approved as Public Law 89-719 without a roll call division in either the
House or the Senate.1 7
To what extent do the differences in roll call behavior support Harry
Stumpf's hypothesis, which posited higher levels of support for the
Supreme Court when it was under direct attack as an institution? The
data summarized in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 affirm Stumpf's hypothesis. In
fact, a comparison of the average percentage of Democratic, Republican
and Northern Democratic Representatives supporting the Court in the
80th through 90th Congress indicate stronger Court support in direct
Court-curbing roll calls for every classification. But it is interesting to
note that the differences are not great except for the Northern
Democrats. 55.4% of all Democrats supported the Court against direct
institutional attacks while 48.1% supported it against Congressional
statutory reversals. 19.2% of the Republicans supported the Court
against direct attacks and 13% supported it against statutory reversals.
But 82.3% of the Northern Democrats supported the Court against
16. United States v. Bull Const. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); United States v. White Beer Brewing
Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
17. From the data gathered by Albert Melone for The American Bar Association and Public
Policy, 1947-1968 (Preliminary draft of a doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1971).
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TABLE I
INCIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALLS AND BILLS
ON (1) REVERSAL OF SUPREME COURT STATUTORY
INTERPRETATIONS AND (2) DIRECT ATTACKS
ON THE SUPREME COURT AS AN INSTITUTION
BY CONGRESS: 1945-1968
Type of Roll Call
(Actual Number of Bills Contested
in Parentheses)
Congress
Statutory Reversals
(by number)
79th
80th
81st
82nd
83rd
84th
85th
86th
87th
88th
89th
90th
Direct Institutional
Attacks
(by number)
I (1)
0
0
0
1 (1)
0
5 (1)
3 (1)
0
8 (2)
9 (3)
5 (1)
direct institutional attacks while 65.3% supported it against
Congressional statutory reversals. It is clear, therefore, that the
distinction between types of anti-Court actions is far more meaningful to
Northern Democrats in the House than it is to those Congressmen who
may comprise the Conservative Coalition. The data for the Senators
indicate a similar pattern. Support by every classification of Senator is
stronger for the Supreme Court in divisions involving direct institutional
attacks. But Senate Republicans gave stronger support in both issue
Vol. 1971:209]
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categories and Northern Democratic Senators did not make as sharp a
distinction between the types of roll calls. Thus, 60% of all Democratic
Senators supported the Court against direct institutional attacks in
contrast to 55.4% against ordinary reversals. A higher percentage of
Senate Republicans opposed institutional attacks (37.3%) than House
Republicans (19.2%); 24.2% of the Republican Senators opposed re-
versals; 83% of the Senate Democrats supported the Court against
direct attacks, virtually identical to House Democrats (82.3%), while
they supported the Court on statutory reversals 72.3% compared to
65.3% by their House counterparts.
TABLE 2
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRAT, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRAT REPRESENTATIVES SUPPORTING
THE COURT ON ROLL CALLS DIRECTLY ATTACKING
THE COURT OR SEEKING TO CURB THE COURT,
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESS
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(10 roll calls) 55.4% 19.2% 82.3%
TABLE 3
THE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRAT, REPUBLICAN,
AND NORTHERN DEMOCRAT SENATORS SUPPORTING THE
SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS ON LEGISLATION
TO CURB OR DIRECTLY ATTACK THE COURT,
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESS
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(21 roll calls) 60.0% 37.3% 83.0%
[Vol. 1971:209
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TABLE 4
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRAT, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRAT REPRESENTATIVES SUPPORTING
THE SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS TO MODIFY
OR REVERSE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS,
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESS
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(35 roll calls) 48.1% 13.0% 65.3%
TABLE 5
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRAT, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRAT SENATORS SUPPORTING THE
SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS ATTEMPTING
TO MODIFY OR REVERSE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS, 80TH THROUGH
90TH CONGRESS
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(71 roll calls) 55.4% 24.2% 72.3%
What do the roll call data show with respect to Arthur Miller's
distinction between statutory reversals involving economic issues
(business, labor, and welfare) and those concerning civil rights and civil
liberties? A comparison of these diverse issue categories generally
contradicts Miller's assumption that Congressional support for the
Court is higher when civil rights and civil liberties rather than economic
issues are subjects for statutory reversal. The data from the House roll
calls consistently support an opposite conclusion. The data for both
chambers are summarized in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9. In the House of
Representatives, all Democrats supported the Court in statutory reversal
roll calls involving economics more strongly than in the area of civil
rights (53% to 42.4%). The House Republicans followed a similar
Vol. 1971:209]
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pattern (16.5% to 8.9%). Northern Democrats, interestingly enough,
showed the widest variation (74.2% to 54.8%). The Senate Democrats as
a whole indicated an identical voting pattern, indicating higher Court
support on economic issues by 56.9% compared to a civil liberties
support level of 50.6%. Conversely, the Senate Republicans did indicate
a higher percentage of civil rights support rather than economic issue
support but, significantly, neither category comprised majority
Republican senatorial support for the Supreme Court (30.8% in civil
rights and liberties compared to 22.1% on economic statutory reversal
decisions). The Northern Democratic Senators also provided very
marginal evidence for Miller's hypothesis by supporting the Supreme
Court on civil rights and liberties issues 74.7% and on economic issues
by 71.6%.
TABLE 6
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES SUPPORTING
THE SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS TO MODIFY OR
REVERSE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN THE AREAS
OF ECONOMICS, LABOR, AND WELFARE,
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(19 roll calIs) 53.0% 16.5% 74.2%
TABLE 7
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES SUPPORTING
THE SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS TO MODIFY OR
REVERSE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN THE AREA
OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, 80TH THROUGH
90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(16 roll calls) 42.4% 8.9% 54.8%
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss2/3
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TABLE 8
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC SENATORS SUPPORTING
THE SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS TO MODIFY OR
REVERSE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
ECONOMIC, WELFARE AND LABOR ISSUES
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(54 roll calls) 56.9% 22.1% 71.6%
TABLE 9
AVERAGE PERCEN rAGE OF DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC SENATORS SUPPORTING THE
SUPREME COURT ON ROLL CALLS ATTEMPTING TO
MODIFY OR REVERSE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
RELATING TO CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES,
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Average
Percentage
(17 roll calls) 50.6% 30.8% 74.7%
As was true in the preliminary investigation of roll call data conducted
by John R. Schmidhauser and Larry L. Berg," this additional
investigation indicates that Congressional voting patterns relating to
Supreme Court support or opposition bear a close resemblance to the
overall voting tendencies of House and Senate members. For example,
Jewell and Patterson had summed up the research findings on party
differences and party cohesion in 1966 as follows:
The few studies available indicate that the Democratic congressmen
18. See CONGRESS AND THE COURT, esp. Chapter VII.
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Washington University Open Scholarship
220 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
who vote most consistently with the party have been those from Northern
metropolitan districts, with a high proportion of foreign-born or (in more
recent years) non-white population. Rural Republicans are likely to have
a more loyal voting record than those who represent the kind of
metropolitan distrust that usually votes Democratic."
Basic to most scholarly evaluations of Congressional-Court relations
has been the assumption that Congressmen view the Court as a hallowed
institution. A's was indicated above, if this assumption is valid, then the
members of Congress presumably will treat judiciary-oriented issues
different from non-judicial issues and will vote in a manner which
reflects special attention to the Court as an institution. Neither the
original data nor the additional data analyzed in this study of
Congressional roll call behavior indicate this kind of marked departure
from the "normal" partisan and regional patterns of voting. Indeed, a
comparison of party cohesion indexes by table and by graphic figure
etches more clearly the persistence of party differences leavened, of
course, by the significant impact of the Conservative Coalition.
Coalition voting on these judiciary-oriented roll calls generally weakened
Democratic rather than Republican unity. Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 and
Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 sum up the new data while Figures I and
2 are reproduced for comparative purposes.
TABLE 10
RICE INDEX OF COHESION FOR DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES ON ROLL CALLS
TO MODIFY OR REVERSE COURT DECISIONS IN THE
AREAS OF ECONOMICS, LABOR, AND WELFARE,
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Rice Index
(19 roll calls) 17.4 65.1 48.0
19. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 437 (1966).
[Vol. 1971:209
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss2/3
Vol. 1971:209] COURT-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
TABLE 11
RICE INDEX OF COHESION FOR DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES ON ROLL CALLS
TO MODIFY OR REVERSE COURT DECISIONS IN THE
AREA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, 80TH
THROUGH 90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Rice Index
(16 roll calls) 29.8 75.9 35.4
TABLE 12
RICE INDEX OF COHESION FOR DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC SENATORS ON ROLL CALLS MODIFYING
OR REVERSING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO
ECONOMIC, WELFARE OR LABOR ISSUES,
80TH THROUGH 90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Rice Index
(54 roll calls) 31.3 61.2 48.7
TABLE 13
RICE INDEX OF COHESION FOR DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN AND
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC SENATORS ON ROLL CALLS MODIFYING
OR REVERSING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RELATING
TO CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES, 80TH
THROUGH 90TH CONGRESSES
Party
Northern
Democrat Republican Democrat
Rice Index
(17 roll calls) 41.4 56.9 58.0
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COURT-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
II. LAWYER-CONGRESSMEN AND COURT SUPPORT
Some political scientists accorded a particularly reverential role to
lawyer-legislators apparently on the assumption that the professional
socialization of lawyers in some way contributed to early development of
such an institutional attitude. An initial investigation of the hypothesis
was made utilizing all the judiciary-oriented roll calls voted upon in the
Senate, 2nd Session, 79th Congress. Four separate votes, all involving
reversal of statutory interpretation issues comprised the total. The
percentage of lawyer-legislators and non-lawyer legislators supporting
or opposing the Supreme Court is summarized for each consecutive roll
call in Table 14. The percentages were derived through utilization of the
Nucros program for multivariate cross-classification developed by
Professor Kenneth Janda of Northwestern University and adapted for
the Political Research Laboratory, University of Iowa, by Merle
Wood.2
TABLE 14
SENATORIAL LAWYER AND NON-LAWYER SUPPORT FOR THE
SUPREME COURT, 2ND SESSION, 79TH CONGRESS
BY PERCENTAGE
(Roll Call No. 3)
Lawyer Non-Lawyer
Pro-Court 27% 36%
Anti-Court 71% 60%
(Roll Call No. 4)
Lawyer Non-Lawyer
Pro-Court 43% 46%
Anti-Court 57% 54%
(Roll Call No. 5)
Lawyer Non-Lawyer
Pro-Court 39% 39%
Anti-Court 61% 61%
(Roll Call No. 6)
Lawyer Non-Lawyer
Pro-Court 44% 39%
Anti-Court 52% 61%
20. K. JANDA, DATA PROCESSING
CONGRESS AND THE COURT.
153-168, esp. 161-67 (1969). For the statistical tables see
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The results not only fail to support the lawyers' 'reverence'
hypothesis, in fact, in only one roll call is the percentage of lawyer-
legislators supporting the Court higher (by a slight margin) than that of
the non-lawyer legislators. In two roll calls the reverse is true, while in
the third the percentages are identical.
One tentative explanation for the conspicuous lack of lawyer-
Congressional support for the Court may be provided by a more incisive
investigation of the social and political role of the lawyers' professional
associations.
The total environment in which members of the Supreme Court
interact with members of Congress encompasses a variety of
relationships which provide links between the two institutions. Thus,
lawyers, officials of legal professional organizations, and law school
faculty members comprise the "attentive constituents" of the judiciaries
in a manner not totally dissimilar to that of V.O. Key's middlemen of
politics.21 During the many decades of institutional maturation and
change which have influenced the legal profession in America, many
fundamental developments were taking place. The fierce antagonism
which was often directed against lawyers during the first four decad6s of
the 19th century gradually was replaced by conditions much more
advantageous to lawyers as professionals, to the development of legal
professional associations, and to the enhanced influence of corporate law
firms. The frontal attacks upon lawyers typified by William Sampson's
"Anniversary Discourse" of 1824, were, during the evolution of the 19th
century, superceded by a gradual strengthening of the position of lawyers
and the common law and by the development and growth of lawyers'
associatons.2 Out of this period of transition has emerged strong private
political institutions whose total impact upon the federal judicial system
is still not fully understood. Indeed, the relative paucity of information
concerning the interest group and private political roles of legal
professional groups serves to substantiate Frank Sorauf's contention
that "the large and powerful groups now languish as an unexplored area
of political science." 3
21. See Boynton, Patterson & Hedlund, The Missing Links in Legislative Politics: Attentive
Constituents, 31 J. POL. 700-701,709-715 (1969).
22. Compare, for example, Sampson's negative "Discourse" of 1824 with Joseph Story's
inaugural discourse of 1829 and the proliferation of affirmative commentaries which were presented
in the 1830's, '40's and '50's in TmE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 119-134, 176 et seq. (P. Miller ed.
1962).
23. Quoted in Dayton McKean's Forward to HALL at vii.
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By 1970, the American Bar Association has emerged from nearly a
century of development as the single most influential of the lawyer
associations in the nation. By the 1960's, the ABA was recognized as a
significant intermediary in interest group negotiations and efforts. As
such the ABA has participated regularly in the "summit" conferences of
the two most influential coalitions of business oriented interest
groups-the Greenbrier Conferences and the meetings of the Conference
of National Organizations. u
A preliminary investigation of the American Bar Association's
lobbying activities before Congressional committees suggests that
economic and ideological objectives may be more significant objectives
than development of attitudes of reverence for the Supreme Court
among lawyer-Congressmen. To provide some measure of the diversity
of the ABA's legislative interests, the following summary of cooperative
lobbying efforts was compiled. The American Bar Association
supported a constitutional amendment designed to overrule Baker v.
Carr in 1965.2
ABA COOPERATED WITH: ABA WAS OPPOSED BY:
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
National Association of
Manufacturers
National Association of
Real Estate Boards
U.S. Junior Chamber of
Commerce
American Farm Bureau
Federation
National Cotton Council of
America
National Farmers Union
National Livestock Feeders
Association
National Council of Farmer
Cooperatives
Liberty Lobby
Citizens Committee for Balanced
Legislative Representation
American Civil Liberties Union
American Veterans Committee
AFL-CIO
International Ladies Garments
Workers Union
Americans for Democratic Action
Alliance for Social, Economic
and Political Progress
American Ethical Union
American Jewish Congress
24. Id. 32-34, 188-212. Chapter V in CONGRESS AND THE COURT explores some of the
relationships of this national lawyers' association to the federal judiciary, in particular the role
played by the American Bar Association as an intermediary in Presidential-Supreme Court
relations and in Congressional relations with the federal judiciary.
25. Hearings on S.J. Res. 2 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965).
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In 1962, the ABA opposed Senate Joint Resolution 159 which sought to
overrule statutory interpretations of aspects of the Fair Trade Act.2'
ABA COOPERATED WITH:
AFL-CIO
Democratic Administration
Food Town Ethical
Pharmacies, Inc.
National Association of
Consumer Organizations,
Inc.
National Consumer League
National Association of
Retired Persons
National Retail Furniture
Association
Independent Oil Men's
Association of New England
National Oil Jobbers
Conference
National Retired Teachers
Association
ABA WAS OPPOSED BY:
American Association of Small
Business
Chemical and Research Manu-
facturers Association
Corning Glass Works Co.
Daneville Wholesale Association
Evyan Perfumes
Hamilton Watch Co.
Hastings Manufacturing Co.
Green Shoe Manufacturing Co.
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co.
McKesson and Robbins, Inc.
National Association of Retail
Druggists
National Small Business
Association
National Retail Hardware
Association
National Wholesale Druggist
Association
National Wholesale Jewelers'
Association
Meiers Wine Cellars, Inc.
Lincoln Metal Products Corp.
Retail Gasoline Dealers'
Association
Retail Jewelers of America
P. H. Hanes Knitting Co.
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.
Troy Industries, Inc.
Quality Brands Associates of
America, Inc.
Union Underwear Co.
26. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. McKesson,
351 U.S. 305 (1955); Hearings on S.J. Res. 159 Before the House Ways and Means Comm.,
87th Cong.,2d Sess. (1962).
[Vol. 1971:209
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In another instance, the ABA opposed the Kennedy Administration's
effort to obtain authorization for the Department of Justice to make
demands for evidence in civil anti-trust investigations. Here the Justice
Department wanted a change in the law to circumvent U.S. v. Proctor
and Gamble.27
ABA COOPERATED WITH: ABA WAS OPPOSED BY:
American Mining Congress Justice Department of the
Association of the Bar of Kennedy Administration
the City of New York
National Coal Association
National Association of
Manufacturers
Manufacturing Chemist
Association
These samples of ABA lobbying efforts are not sufficient to establish
a consistent ideological or economic pattern, but they were included to
illustrate the diversity of interests of the most influential of the legal
professional associations. These diverse interests included both Court
opposition as well as Court support in a variety of statutory reversal
controversies. At this very preliminary stage of the investigation, it is
difficult to posit an hypothesis that the socialization of lawyers in
associations such as the American Bar Association is likely to engender
consistent support for the Court in statutory reversal conflicts in the
Congress.
III. CONCLUSION
The assumptions which have comprised the conventional wisdom
concerning the fundamentals of Court-Congressional relations are still
given wide currency as the following commentator in the Christian
Science Monitor indicated:
• . . Most lawmakers appear to expect that, as before, an undefined sense
of congressional tolerance will provide the bridge. . .
. . . even when Congress has given vent to the noisiest complaints about
the court by the constituents back home, the lawmakers have kept an
attitude of near reverence for the court's standing as the ultimate
constitutional arbiter. . ..
27. 356 U.S. 677 (1958). See also Hearings on S. 167 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
28. Congress v. the Court, Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 1960, § 2, at 9.
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The evidence suggests a more careful evaluation lest an
overdependence upon an alleged Congressional attitude of "reverence"
for the Court compound the difficulty by masking the significance of the
Court's modern opposition.
The investigation of Court oriented voting divisions in the period
1945-1968 indicates that partisan and ideological considerations play a
far greater role in Congressional behavior toward the Court than
protagonists of the "reverence" theme have recognized. The persistence
and relative growth of Conservative Coalition antagonism toward the
Supreme Court should be evaluated more thoroughly. Since. 1969, the
presence of a President who has often associated himself with the
Conservative Coalition on issues involving crime, procedural due process
and judicial nominations has compounded the seriousness of the
Supreme Court's position.
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